OPINION

MAY, Judge.

David Delagrange appeals his conviction of four counts of Class C felony attempted child exploitation.1 Delagrange presents two issues, one of which we find dispositive: Whether the trial court erred when it denied Delagrange's motion for directed verdict.2 We reverse and remand.

On February 27, 2010, Delagrange, outfitted with video camera mounted to his shoe and controlled through an apparatus in his pants, traveled to Castleton Square Mall in Indianapolis. Once at the mall, Delagrange recorded images of the area beneath the skirts of several females, four of whom were minors. Delagrange's conduct triggered concern, and a store manager contacted an off-duty police officer. The officer approached Delagrange, who attempted to flee. Delagrange was immobilized with a taser and arrested. The State subsequently charged Delagrange with four counts of Class C felony attempted child exploitation, ten counts of Class D felony voyeurism,3 and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.4

At the time Delagrange committed these acts, the voyeurism statute stated, in relevant part:

Ind.Code § 35-45-4-5(a) (2005). After Delagrange committed these acts, the legislature amended Ind.Code § 35-45-4-5 to include a new crime, "public voyeurism." P.L. 75-2011, Sec. 1. That section provides: "A person who: (1) without the consent of the individual; and (2) with intent to peep at the private area of an individual; peeps at the private area of an individual and records an image by means of camera commits public voyeurism, a Class A misdemeanor." Ind.Code § 35-45-4-5(d) (2011).

The child exploitation statute states, in relevant part, "(b) A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) manages, produces, sponsors, presents, exhibits, photographs, films, videotapes, or creates a digitized image of any performance or incident that includes sexual conduct by a child under eighteen (18) years of age ... commits child exploitation, a Class C felony." Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(b)(1) (emphasis added). "Sexual conduct" means:

Ind.Code § 35-42-4-4(a)(4).

Due process prohibits Delagrange's convictions under the statutes that existed at the time of his actions, though it appears similar acts in the future could be punished as public voyeurism. As the statutes in force when Delagrange committed his acts required conduct by the child, we are compelled to reverse his convictions and remand, as there was no evidence any of the minors were involved in the type of conduct required by the child exploitation statute.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Delagrange moved to dismiss the voyeurism and attempted child exploitation charges. The parties stipulated to evidence into the record describing the events of February 27. The trial court dismissed the voyeurism charges, but not the attempted child exploitation charges. The trial court certified the partial denial of Delagrange's motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal.

A panel of this court affirmed the denial of Delagrange's motion to dismiss the child exploitation charges, holding Delagrange's activity could fit within the statutory definition of sexual conduct. The case was remanded for trial.

Delagrange's case proceeded to jury trial. After the State presented its case in chief, Delagrange moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied Delagrange's motion, and Delagrange testified on his own behalf. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the four Class C felony attempted child exploitation charges as well as on the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement charge.5 The trial court entered convictions and sentenced Delagrange to four years incarcerated with three years suspended to probation.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

At the close of the State's case, Delagrange requested a directed verdict. For a trial court to grant a motion for a directed verdict,

Edwards v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1254, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

The State charged Delagrange with four counts of Class C felony attempted child exploitation based on incidents involving four girls under age eighteen. Each count had identical language, except for the age and name of the alleged victim. For example, Count I alleged:

(App. at 131.) Delagrange does not dispute he "knowingly or intentionally sought to capture up-skirt photos of panties, boots, high heels, etc., of adult women," (Br. of Appellant at 11), but argues the charging information does not allege he attempted to commit an act that could be considered "sexual conduct by a child."

The State argues this issue was decided as part of Delagrange's interlocutory appeal and, thus, is res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata bars litigation of a claim after a final judgment has been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same parties. Small v. Centocor, Inc. 731 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct. App.2000), reh'g denied. The doctrine exists to prevent repetitive litigation of the same issue. Id.

Delagrange's interlocutory appeal challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against him. In that appeal he argued "the facts, as pleaded in the charging information, do not constitute crimes of attempted child exploitation ... [because] the statutory definition of `sexual conduct' does not encompass his activity at the mall that day." Delagrange, 951 N.E.2d at 595. A divided panel of our court held the allegations in Delagrange's charging information, taken as true, "adequately state the elements of attempt and child exploitation." Id. The majority examined the statutory definition of "sexual conduct" pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-42-4-4(a), specifically the clause, "exhibition of the uncovered genitals intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person." In addition, the majority analyzed the dictionary definition of the word "exhibition," and held it meant, "to show or display." Delagrange, 951 N.E.2d at 595.

That panel did not, however, examine the implications of the clause "by a child" in the child exploitation statute, which is our focus in this opinion. As the opinion on interlocutory appeal did not address the portion of the statute at issue here, the issue herein is not res judicata.6

The charging information follows the language of the child exploitation statute, which states in relevant part: "(b) A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) manages, produces, sponsors, presents, exhibits, photographs, films, videotapes, or creates a digitized image of any performance or incident that includes sexual conduct by a child under eighteen (18) years of age ... commits child exploitation, a Class C felony." Ind.Code § 35-42-4-4(b)(1) (emphasis added). "Sexual conduct" means:

Ind.Code § 35-42-4-4(a)(4).

In support of his motion for a directed verdict, Delagrange argued:

(Tr. at 196-97) (emphasis added). The trial court denied Delagrange's motion.

When interpreting statutes, we use the following standard:

City of Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind.2007). Neither party argues the language of the statute is ambiguous, and thus we apply the "plain, ordinary, and usual" meaning of the words and phrases in the statute.7

The portion of the child exploitation statute relevant to the instant appeal required the State to prove Delagrange attempted to photograph, film, videotape or created a digitized image of any performance or incident that includes sexual conduct, here the "exhibition of the uncovered genitals intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person," Ind.Code § 35-42-4-4(a)(4), "by a child under eighteen (18) years of age." Ind.Code § 35-42-4-4(b)(1) (emphasis added). The phrasing of the statute demands the child be performing the sexual conduct, which herein required the child be exhibiting her uncovered genitals with the intent to satisfy someone's sexual desires. Therefore, in order for Delagrange's attempt to commit child exploitation, each child must have been exhibiting her uncovered genitals with the intent to satisfy sexual desires.

The State presented no evidence the victims exhibited their genitals8 or intended to satisfy anyone's sexual desire. For those reasons, we hold the trial court should have directed a not guilty verdict because the State did not to present evidence to support the elements of Class C felony child exploitation. Accordingly, we reverse Delagrange's four counts of Class C felony child exploitation and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

KIRSCH, J., concurs.

NAJAM, J., dissents with separate opinion.

NAJAM, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the law of the case doctrine bars Delagrange's attempt to relitigate an issue that this court squarely addressed in Delagrange v. State, 951 N.E.2d 593 (Ind.Ct. App.2011) ("Delagrange I"), trans. denied. As we explained in Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corporation v. Save the Valley, Inc., 953 N.E.2d 511, 517-18 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011):

In Delagrange I, Delagrange appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss wherein he alleged that "the facts, as pleaded in the charging information, do not constitute crimes of attempted child exploitation." 951 N.E.2d at 595. In particular, Delagrange's motion to dismiss included the following argument:

Appellant's App. at 75-76 (emphasis added). Because Delagrange assumed, for purposes of his motion to dismiss, that the facts as alleged by the State were true, the posture of this appeal, following a jury trial, is essentially the same as that of the first appeal. In other words, we are merely asked to reexamine whether the facts as alleged in the information, and which are supported by the evidence presented at trial, constitute the crime of child exploitation.

951 N.E.2d at 595. And we held that "[t]hese allegations adequately state the elements of attempt and child exploitation." Id.

In particular, in his appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss, Delagrange challenged only one facet of the definition of "sexual conduct," namely, whether his conduct constituted "exhibition of the uncovered genitals intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person...." Id. Delagrange asserted that "based on the facts as alleged, `[n]o one attempted to do anything to exhibit exposed genitals.'" Id. In addressing this argument, we turned to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, which defines "exhibit" as "to show or display." Id. And we held that, "[i]f Delagrange had taken photographs of uncovered genitals under the alleged victims' skirts or dresses, then he would have shown or displayed them as a digital image. Delagrange's behavior is sufficient to constitute an attempted exhibition as described by statute." Id. (emphasis added).

In this appeal after his convictions, Delagrange alleges that the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he knowingly or intentionally captured a performance or incident that included sexual conduct by a child as charged in the information. In particular, he directs us to evidence showing that he did not exhibit the uncovered genitalia of any of his minor victims. And he contends that any inference that he was attempting to find uncovered genitalia in his quest is "unreasonable." Brief of Appellant at 18. But his argument in support of that contention ignores the fact that he was charged with and convicted of attempted child exploitation. And, again, this court squarely rejected this argument in Delagrange I.

The majority reexamines the element of "sexual conduct by a child" and concludes that it

Op. at 1232 (emphasis added).

First, again, I would hold that the law of the case doctrine precludes such a reconsideration of the relevant statutory language. But, second, the child exploitation statute cannot be interpreted to require that a child be an active participant in the exhibition of her genitals or that the child have the intent to satisfy sexual desires. Such an interpretation improperly focuses the elements of the crime on the actions of the child and undermines the very foundation of the statute, which was designed to protect children. Indeed, the statute protects the very young, including infants and toddlers, who have no awareness of what sexual desires are, as well as children of all ages who are drugged or otherwise unwittingly manipulated by a perpetrator. So I cannot agree that "sexual conduct by a child" mandates any active participation whatsoever by a child. To the contrary, and as we have already held, only the perpetrator need "show or display" the uncovered genitals of a minor child for the sexual desires of any person. See Delagrange I, 951 N.E.2d at 595.

In sum, the law of the case doctrine precludes our consideration of the issues raised in this appeal. And, to the extent that the majority reads the child exploitation statute to require a child victim to actively participate in the sexual conduct element of the crime, I disagree. While the statute may not be well-drafted, the legislature cannot have intended that interpretation. See State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Superior Court, Room Three, 500 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind.1986) (observing that "[u]nder our rules of statutory construction, it cannot be presumed the General Assembly intended language used in a statute to be applied in an illogical manner.") Such an interpretation undermines the goal of the statute, which is to criminalize the exploitation of child victims. For these reasons, I would affirm Delagrange's convictions for attempted child exploitation.